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REFUSALS OF CONSCIENCE: WHAT ARE THEY
AND WHEN SHOULD THEY BE
ACCOMMODATED?
Kent Greenawalt †
Approaching this subject as a decided nonexpert, I want to
explore a number of questions about a right to conscience in respect to
refusals to provide health-care services. My hope is that the questions
will seem important and relevant, even if some of my tentative
answers are controversial or even misguided.
It is helpful to distinguish three levels of analysis: 1) What would
be an ideal scope for rights of conscience if we could put aside
difficulties of administration and political feasibility? 2) What would
be a desirable approach given administrative and political realities?
3) And in what rhetoric should claims of conscience be formulated
when supporters address those with authority to enact legal rights?
I am assuming that at the first two levels, a theorist is aiming to be
as objective and open as possible; I do not suppose that about those
engaging in what I shall call public rhetoric. This can present a dilemma for a scholar who perceives an issue as complex but is strongly
committed to particular outcomes, who finds herself in an influential
role, and believes that effective persuasion demands oversimplification.
Let me give an example, one that starts from my particular sense
of our historical tradition. The basic right of conscience regarded as
critical at the Founding was the ability to develop one’s religious
beliefs and practice worship with co-believers free of government
interference. Although Michael McConnell has made a strong case
that some basic right was recognized to be exempt from the
imposition of general laws not themselves directed at religion,1 other
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University Professor, Columbia University, teaching at Columbia Law School.
He is the author of a two-volume work on the religion clauses, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION, VOL. I: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS (2006), VOL. II: ESTABLISHMENT AND
FAIRNESS (2008).
1. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1990).
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able scholars disagree,2 and insofar as one can discern their position
on this precise question in relation to the Free Exercise Clause, the
majority of the Supreme Court apparently agrees with those scholars.3
One thing that is clear is that John Locke, in the small amount of
attention he gave to the question, saw no problem with applying
general, neutral laws to those with opposed religious conviction. He
suggested that a law against killing cattle could properly be enforced
against those who believed they should engage in religious sacrifices
of cattle.4 I am unaware of any suggestions that the Founders would
have contemplated the government mandating how private businesses
should respond to employees who decline from conscience to perform
tasks that are part of their jobs.
I do not mean to imply that historical recognition of the
importance of conscience is irrelevant, but some vital steps need to be
filled in—namely, that the significance of freedom of conscience extends
beyond what some early proponents clearly recognized, that we now
see the government as a potential protector of liberty, as well as an
infringer of liberty, and that with pervasive modern government
involvement in the provision of services and in ordering the economy,
restrictions on how private employers deal with their own workers
make sense. Laws banning racial, sexual, and religious discrimination
are a powerful illustration, and indeed an employer’s refusal to
accommodate conscience, especially religious conscience, can be regarded as one form of such discrimination.
The dilemma for someone who advocates government protection
of conscience is how much of this complexity to acknowledge when
one is urgently seeking reform. A simpler approach that stresses our
tradition of freedom of conscience may be more effective. In any
event, for the third level of analysis, rhetorical effectiveness, one
might choose to simplify matters not only in respect to how rights are
formulated but also in respect to their theoretical justifications.
In what follows, I will disregard two very important distinctions
for our system of government. Although I am strongly opposed to

2. See, e.g., Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An
Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 916 (1992).
3. I put the point in this qualified form because in the central case of Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the main source for drawing out the views of justices on
this question, the emphasis is on what is administrable, not what was historically intended. Id.
at 880.
4. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), reprinted in LOCKE ON TOLERATION
3, 25–26 (Richard Vernon ed., Michael Silverthorne trans., 2010) (1796).
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the Supreme Court’s ruling in Employment Division v. Smith that the
Free Exercise Clause provides no protection against the application of
typical neutral laws of general application,5 I shall not consider how
far claims of conscience in respect to health care should be constitutionally grounded. I treat the issues as ones to be resolved by
statute. I also disregard the problem of how much should be resolved
by federal rather than state law.
At the first level I have suggested, the ideal scope for rights of
conscience, some of the critical questions are: What classes of persons
should be able to invoke a legal right? What attitude on their part
should give rise to the right? Should nonreligious as well as religious
claims be included? What should be the scope of the right in relation
to the desires and needs of those seeking health care and the needs of
institutions providing it? And what actions should the right protect
against and with what remedies for violations?
The attitude that should underlie a right of conscience presents a
fascinating question that could affect perceptions about what is
involved, but probably has little operational significance.
Some laws provide simply that one cannot be required to participate; others are cast in terms of “moral or religious grounds,” “conscience,” or “conscientious objection.”6 A person who self-consciously
objects to providing a form of health care because doing so triggers
painful memories or is aesthetically unpleasant does not have a moral
objection or, I shall argue, a claim of conscience. In one respect,
claims of conscience are a narrower category than all moral objections.
A nurse who believes that elective plastic surgery wastes resources,
perpetuates unhealthy denials of aging, and reflects the worst of a
culture that is increasingly materialist and superficial, may have
moral reasons not to participate but these do not, without more, make
her assistance an act against conscience. I believe this term in its
modern usage connotes something stronger,7 that she would
disregard a deep aspect of her identity if she went along.8 Along this
vague spectrum, “conscientious objection” may be an even stronger
5. 494 U.S. at 878–79.
6. See Lynn D. Wardle, Protection of Health-Care Providers’ Rights of Conscience in
American Law: Present, Past, and Future, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 16–33 (2010) (giving a summary of laws providing exemptions).
7. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious
Exemptions, 15 LEGAL THEORY 215, 225–33 (2009) (providing an account of the various
conceptions of “conscience”).
8. William Galston offers a similar account of “conscience.” Id. at 233 (citing WILLIAM
GALSTON, THE PRACTICE OF LIBERAL PLURALISM 67 (2005)).
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term, one that seems to suggest that an individual would rather
undergo (or believe that she should be willing to undergo) serious
hardship rather than perform the act in question. We do not think a
person is a genuine conscientious objector to military service if he
thinks performing that service is preferable to spending two months
in jail. We do not think that someone is a conscientious objector to
jury service if she thinks doing jury duty is preferable to paying a fine
of $200.
Is it possible that objections in conscience may extend beyond
moral reasons? Suppose the person with the painful memory or strong
aesthetic distaste says, “This is now part of my identity. I have an
objection grounded in my conscience, given who I take myself to be.”
This is a conceivable way to speak of conscience, one that cannot be
ruled out by reference to the term’s general meaning; 9 for the purpose
of a legal exemption, from ordinary responsibilities at least, nonreligious
conscience is better conceived as having a moral dimension.10 How to
treat an obligation believed to be owed to God that is not about
morality, such as the obligation to wear a yarmulke, is a harder question.
As with moral claims in general,11 all religious claims is a broader
category than religious claims of conscience. A Roman Catholic druggist
might have a religious objection to providing artificial means of birth
control, without that objection rising to a claim of conscience.12
This brings us to the division between religious claims of conscience and nonreligious ones. Perhaps in order to avoid the painful
question whether religious claims really should be preferred, the
Supreme Court on occasion, like some scholars, has been inclined to
treat all genuine claims of conscience as religious.13 I think this is both
artificial conceptually and unnecessary to reach sound constitutional
conclusions.14
9. See id. at 233–37 (citing the “volitional necessity” view from HARRY FRANKFURT, THE
REASONS OF LOVE 46 (2004)).
10. See Wardle, supra note 6, at 27–41 (writing of conscience clauses as covering moral and
religious beliefs).
11. I am counting most claims based on religious connections as moral claims that rest on
religious premises.
12. In my outsider’s understanding, the church has rather specific guidelines about what
form of assistance to immoral acts step over the permissible line, but individual Catholics have
some room to develop their own convictions of conscience about right and wrong behavior.
13. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
14. The latter assumption rests on the premise that other bases for equal treatment are
plausible, that both the Equal Protection Clause and the religious clauses themselves sometimes
point to equal treatment of religious and nonreligious conscience.
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What is wrong with treating all claims of conscience as religious?
First, we think of some people as nonreligious or antireligious; we
cannot deny that these people could have a claim of conscience. Do
we want to say that whenever they do, they have become partly
religious? And what of religious people in our society? Many sincere
Christians experience aspects of moral life that they perceive as only
remotely connected to their religious convictions and practice. A wife
who is tempted to leave her husband but is afraid she might lose
custody of her children, says, “I cannot in good conscience abandon
the kids. This is not a religious matter for me, but my conscience tells
me that would be deeply wrong.” If pressed, she might acknowledge
that her faith includes notions of love and family responsibility, but in
her mind and feelings, the very high priority she places on staying
with her children is only remotely related to religion. Although this
example raises perplexing questions about cause and effect and about
what linkage to religion is needed to make a claim of conscience
religious, it also helps to show the untenability of assuming that all
claims of conscience are automatically religious.
I am fully aware of the difficulty of distinguishing the religious
from the nonreligious, but a great many phenomena fall clearly on
each side of the divide, leaving a fuzzy border in the middle.
The equality argument for treating all claims of conscience
similarly is straightforward. Is there any plausible basis for religion
being singled out for special treatment?
One reason, of course, is such treatment within our legal and
cultural traditions.15 Another reason in regard to some kinds of claims
is the difficulty of imagining a nonreligious analogue. Suppose a
right were created not to participate in blood transfusions. Given a
high probability of safe blood, we are hard put to imagine a nonreligious claim of conscience of the same magnitude as the Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ rejection of that practice.
What if there are nonreligious analogues? One might think the
government’s relation to implicit truth claims differs. A typical religious
objection offers a claim of truth about how people really should act.
Since the government does well to steer clear of the truth of religious
premises that it is not in a good position to evaluate with confidence,16

15. The legal tradition must obviously include the language of the religion clauses.
16. Paul Horwitz develops this position in the draft of a book to be published by Oxford
University Press. PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION
(forthcoming 2011) (on file with the Ave Maria Law Review).
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accommodation is appealing.17 Some nonreligious claims of conscience may offer no claim about general truth, just an assertion about
what feels right to an individual. And if a person does rely on a
nonreligious general moral judgment, one may think the government
has a more solid basis to impose the judgment of the rest of society
than with a religious claim. This may seem particularly true if a claim
of conscience depends on an assessment that is contrary to convincing
empirical evidence, as when careful studies are at odds with the
opinion of some parents that particular vaccinations are highly dangerous for their children.18
A different basis for possible differentiation concerns what is at
stake. Perhaps religious objectors usually perceive that more is at
stake, including their eternal welfare. This sense of magnitude of
impairment might be related to what a claimant would be willing to
sacrifice to avoid doing a wrongful act. In both respects, a huge
amount depends on a religion’s particular theology, as well as a
claimant’s personal psychology. The nonreligious claimant may respond that for her more is at stake than for those who believe God
generously forgives all confessed sins.
A final basis for differentiation that takes us to the second level,
and administrability, is potential fraud. If people have a strong motivation to receive an exemption (as do draftees in wartime), identifying
the sincerity of a religious claimant may be simpler than evaluating a
nonreligious one. Of course, if people have little incentive to make a
claim unless they possess a genuinely strong objection, the fraud
concern disappears.
Two strong reasons not to limit a privilege to religious claims are
the desirability of avoiding political controversy over giving religion a
special place and eliminating any need for those evaluating claims to
decide just which ones are religious.
Given the practical realities of administrability and the desirability
of minimizing political controversy, I believe rights of conscience for
individuals not to participate in health-care services should be formulated in terms that are not limited to religion. But that leaves open a
serious question about arguments in favor of such rights. Both
17. Of course, the government does implicitly reject many relevant truth claims of
religions, such as the desirability of pacifism, but nonetheless the sense that many decent
members of society hold a different opinion on untestable grounds is a basis not to compel them
to act contrary to conscience.
18. This illustration, I recognize, falls outside the scope of my topic and falls inside the
somewhat related domain of conscience claims to refuse medical treatment.
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because the basis for an exemption is often particularly strong for
religious claimants and because such exemptions are most strongly
supported by our traditions, it would be mistaken to cast arguments
for rights of conscience only in terms of broader conceptions of
conscience. Further, in many areas of the country, the rhetoric in favor
of refusals of conscience may be most effective if it emphasizes religion.
My tentative opinion is that institutional rights to refuse health
care should be limited to religious organizations and facilities that are
linked to them. Almost all institutional providers of health care, if not
all, have substantial discretion as to what services to offer. If a
legislature, administrative agency, or quasi-public supervisory body,
has determined that a service is so important all institutions should
provide it, an exception for religious enterprises that view the service
as deeply immoral and contrary to God’s will makes sense; but I do
not perceive reasons that are nearly as convincing for those who have
created and oversee nonreligious institutions. Defending this perception is not simple, but it may arise from a sense that religious
organizations are fundamental entities independent of the state,
something that is not true about most nonreligious organizations
created for providing services such as health care.
Our inquiry into various ways in which claims might be
categorized raises a more general point about virtually all possible
conscience claims not to provide health care. What is at stake in
individual instances is less momentous than for exemptions from a
military draft. Draft boards examined the bona fides of individual
claimants, but such examinations will be rare in respect to health care.
A person who asserts a privilege not to participate may well suffer
embarrassment and inconvenience, influencing negatively the respect
of bosses and coworkers and their chances of advancement (whatever
protection the law formally grants); but if a health-care worker is
willing to assert an undoubted legal right, he is very unlikely to be
refused on the basis that he is insincere altogether or has mistakenly
identified a modest moral objection as a claim of conscience. It will be
a rare occasion on which some administration will try to plumb the
depths of a claimant’s moral sensibility. All this strongly suggests
that in practice the exact wording of a conscience clause in respect to a
claimant’s necessary conviction may not matter much, beyond
sending a message about how far the state is bending itself and is
requiring private employers to bend.
What may be said against any legal recognitions of claims of
conscience not to provide health care? We may divide arguments into
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those opposed in principle to such concessions and those that insist
on the importance of providing benefits to those seeking health care.
The most straightforward principled objection is that individuals
who choose to work for the government or to be licensed in lines of
work for which licenses are designed to protect and serve the public
should be willing to do what public need calls for, not to select among
services they choose to provide. Thus, doctors, nurses, druggists,
and others should not be privileged to opt out. A similar objection
can be made in respect to institutions that wish to decline providing
important services.
As a knock-down argument, this fails. Individuals should not be
effectively barred from entire lines of work, or from government
employment, for which they are otherwise admirably suited, if they
cannot bring themselves to perform a small percentage of the typical
tasks and if excusing them carries virtually no cost in the provision of
services. If only a small percentage of doctors and nurses are needed
to perform sterilizations, and some people called to these vocations
cannot conscientiously participate, why not let them decline?
This conclusion is strengthened if one starts from the premise that
institutions qualified to perform the relevant services can themselves
be selective. If we put aside life-saving medical procedures and
avoidance of medical malpractice (as performing some operations
without blood transfusions), hospitals can commonly decline to
perform operations private patients might desire, including abortions,
sterilizations, and elective plastic surgery.19 If the institutions can be
selective in this way, why should not medical practitioners? One
answer is that individuals have chosen to work for an employer and,
therefore, may fairly be expected to do all the employer asks. But if
accommodating conscience is important, the government reasonably
insists on it. Title VII’s requirement of “reasonabl[e] accommodat[ion]”
to religious observance, if the employer can do that without “undue
hardship,” already embodies this principle.20 If the employer wants
all its workers to attend prayer meetings, give customers a verbal
Christian message in December, or work without head coverings, it
cannot insist that those with religious objections do so. Regrettably,
the Supreme Court has interpreted this language in Title VII, which
19. The freedom of hospitals follows from the absence of laws that require them to provide
particular services. The similar freedom of pharmacies in respect to providing particular drugs
is noted in Robin Fretwell Wilson, Essay: The Limits of Conscience: Moral Clashes over Deeply
Divisive Healthcare Procedures, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 52–54 (2008).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006).
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may itself reach some refusals to provide health-care services, to have
very little bite.21 An explicit right of conscience for health-care workers
imposed on private employers would extend protection, but it is not
fundamentally different in principle.
The reasons not to insist on individuals providing services when
they believe that would be deeply wrong apply to institutions, so
long as institutional choice will not thwart individuals obtaining
those services. (However, as I have noted, I doubt that the reasons
are strong enough to provide a legal right of conscience for nonreligious institutions.)
If the argument in regard to those who work for the government
or are licensed in vocations that benefit the public is not decisive
against a right of conscience, I believe that it does carry some weight
that the individual worker’s claim is somewhat weaker if she has
undertaken by choice to perform a public service understood in a
certain way.
Four notable variations involve the percentage of a job that is
involved, expectations, calling, and public attitudes. The first two of
these are obvious. The higher the proportion of his usual tasks to
which a worker objects, the weaker his claim that he should be given
a legal right to decline. A player who, like the Olympian hero of
Chariots of Fire, cannot participate in sports events on Sunday, does
not belong in the National Football League, even though every team
occasionally plays on another day. The point about expectations concerns what an individual reasonably perceived were the dimensions
of her job when she trained for it. When I was going to law school,
performing abortions was still criminal in nearly every state. Someone
in nursing school would not have expected that she would be called
on to assist abortions. Reasonable belief about what a job entails is
one measure of whether refusals of conscience should be protected.
The point about calling is more subtle, complex, and debatable.
Speaking generally, some jobs require special talents and are of a
nature that individuals feel called upon to perform them. My sister
Ann felt called to be a minister; my daughter Sarah felt called to work
with young children. Many people find themselves in jobs without
any special sense that they are suited for them by talent or inclination.
I doubt if many persons feel called to be cashiers at checkout counters.

21. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 –76, 84– 85 (1977) (stating
that requiring an employer to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to accommodate an
employee’s religious holiday observances is an undue hardship).
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Generalizations about this are extremely hazardous, and, absent
empirical data, are bound to reflect all sorts of conscious and
unconscious prejudices. But to bring us within the realm of the relevant,
I would guess that a higher percentage of doctors and nurses have a
sense of calling than do lawyers, secretaries, and druggists and that
more druggists have a sense of calling than the personnel who hand
drugs to customers in large urban drugstores. A well-designed empirical inquiry might show that my intuitions are way off the mark.
In any event, I think that the greater the sense of calling the more
unfortunate it is if individuals are required to do work that offends
conscience. It is regrettable for individuals deeply drawn to a vocation to feel barred from doing work through which, typically, they
want to serve others; it is also regrettable for society to lose highly
motivated performers. Again, this seems to me to have more application to doctors and nurses than to druggists, but I would welcome
any reasons to shift that appraisal.
A final variation concerns public attitudes. If the community is
deeply divided over whether a form of health care involves a serious
wrong, there is a powerful argument that no individual or institution
should be required to provide it. Over the last half-century that has
been the case with elective abortion. It is hardly surprising that the
vast majority of rights of conscience initially established by state
legislatures have concerned abortion,22 a practice which many of the
legislators themselves undoubtedly thought was sinful. If a claim of
conscience is idiosyncratic, and even seems bizarre to most members
of the community, any public need to accommodate is weakened.
Ironically, however, it may be in just such circumstances that a legal
right might be most significant, since individuals holding the unpopular opinion may find it particularly hard to discover employers
who share that opinion or are willing to accommodate it. Needless to
say, there is a vast intermediate terrain in which a moral opinion has
some wider support but an overwhelming majority rejects it. I believe
objections to the “morning after pill,” artificial birth control, voluntary
sterilization, and assisted reproduction all fall into this intermediate
category.
Related both to the point about calling and to public attitudes is
the degree of involvement with the practice that is deemed immoral.
That a nurse should not have to participate in abortions that she
22. See Katherine A. White, Crisis of Conscience: Reconciling Religious Health Care Providers’ Beliefs and Patients’ Rights, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1703, 1705–11 (1999).
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regards as the murder of a human being seems quite different from
the involvement of pharmacy employees with the morning after pill
and Plan B, whose use may be thought to involve a kind of abortion,
depending on what is understood as the point of conception. The
pharmacy orders the pills; a druggist pours the requisite number from
a big bottle into a smaller bottle and hands that bottle to a clerk, who
in turn hands it to the customer. A cashier rings up the charge.
Should each of these workers be able to refuse to participate? There
comes a point at which an individual’s involvement is so remote, a
right to refuse seems excessive. A possible counter to this analysis is
that very few will claim a right when their involvement is remote, and
that accommodating those whose claim of conscience is honest is
harmless and desirable.
A second argument of principle against a right of conscience is
much vaguer and rests on an empirical assumption that is probably
impossible to establish. We live in a society that has become increasingly individual over time, with citizens encouraged to seek what is
best for themselves. In one sense, a right of conscience is a counter,
focusing as it does on perceived obligation, not self-satisfaction. But
the right is strongly individualistic, crediting the individual’s conviction against the general perception of what is socially desirable.
One might think that creating a legal right, especially a broad one not
limited to religious conviction, will contribute to an unhealthy sense
that each individual judges for herself, giving little or no weight to a
sense of community and to prevailing opinions within the society
about what is needed.
The more direct practical arguments against a right involve the
competing interests of those seeking health care. How those interests
should be evaluated affects whether any legal rights make sense, to
whom such rights should extend, and how such rights should be
formulated. It is vital that individuals not forego valuable health
services that they want and need. Here the crucial issues are about
degree of need and how broadly to understand or extend “forego.”
Of course, no one thinks it is all right if life-saving services are denied;
but what of facelifts? These services are definitely wanted by some,
but are not needed in any strict sense. Perhaps the perceived need of
services should figure to a degree in designing rights of conscience,
but partly for reasons of practical administrability, whatever legitimate
services people want should be regarded as ones that should actually
be available to them.
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Troubling questions arise over the recipient’s avoidance of
inconvenience and embarrassment. Suppose the only drugstore in a
village has two pharmacists who alternate at work. One who objects
to providing all drugs related to birth control works from 3 p.m. to
10 p.m. every day. Mary, who has been prescribed the pill, works in a
factory from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. She could drive thirty miles to the next
town in the evening or be excused from work during a period in the
morning, but either option is considerably more inconvenient than
going in the early evening to the local pharmacy.23 Should we worry
about her inconvenience? I am inclined to think that for this example,
substantial inconvenience should be the test—that consumers should
not have to undergo substantial inconvenience to satisfy a statecreated legal right of conscience. On the other hand, if Mary was still
able to get an abortion, an inconvenience of this magnitude should
not override the conviction of nurses that their participation assists
in murder.
Imagine a different scenario in the drugstore. There are two druggists at one time. Mary hands her prescription to the objector. He
announces, “I’m sorry I don’t aid anyone who is engaging in birth
control, but I’ll hand your prescription to my colleague.” Especially
in a small town, such an interchange, overheard by others, could be
highly embarrassing for Mary. I am inclined to think that a right of
conscience should not be vindicated when the result would be acute
embarrassment for the person seeking health care. Still, the employer
who has an objecting worker should have a responsibility to try to
arrange matters so that such embarrassment is avoided, and ordinarily
that should be possible.
In addition to concerns about individual recipients are ones about
operating burdens for providers. Can an employer accede to consciences without undue administrative burdens, burdens that will
eventuate in higher costs for those who receive and insure health
care? That will depend greatly on individual circumstances. One
example of real inconvenience involved a hospital that could get a
substitute for a nurse-anesthetist only by bringing in someone from

23. Wilson, supra note 19, at 52–54, provides a much fuller account of what realistically is
the degree of inconvenience if a local pharmacy refuses to carry a drug. In the balance she
carefully strikes, I do not think she would regard a round trip of 60 miles as too severe an
inconvenience.
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fifty-five miles away who was available only when her regular job
schedule did not conflict.24
Where does all this leave me? In principle, I believe a legal right
of conscience is appropriate for many forms of health care for which
potential individual providers have objections in conscience. But such
a right should, for most matters, not seriously interfere with the
provision of health care in a manner that is reasonably convenient and
avoids great embarrassment. To make my present sense more concrete,
I will share my reaction to some of the litigated instances that have
attracted the attention of scholars in the field. I will then consider the
comparative merits of a broad, general approach to one that focuses
on particular subjects.
There is a double risk in focusing on individual situations as a
basis for how general rules should be formulated. One may forget
other relevant factors not present in the particular instance; even if
that does not happen, there is a tendency to give undue importance to
what seems most salient in the instance that is staring one in the
face.25 My brief response to various factual settings here is not meant
to suggest specific formulations that are desirable; the aims are only
to reveal my own sense of how interests should be balanced and to
inform a discussion of how to approach the question of formulations.
Those with sharply variant perceptions about how claims of conscience
should be weighed against consumer interests and convenience of
administration may see the formulation problem in quite different
ways.
Swanson v. St. John’s Lutheran Hospital 26 raises the question of the
kind of objection that is needed. As a nurse-anesthetist, Ms. Swanson
had participated in numerous sterilizations; after a disturbing experience with a dilation and curettage, she refused to perform any
tubal ligations.27 The Montana Supreme Court sustained her claim
that her discharge was unlawful under state law;28 but two of the five
justices, relying on her sudden change of view, some expressed
inconsistencies, and the illogic of her refusing to participate in a
24. Swanson v. St. John’s Lutheran Hosp., 597 P.2d 702, 709–10 (Mont. 1979) (holding that
the inconvenience was irrelevant under the state statute).
25. Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, The Trouble with Cases 27 (Univ. of Va. Sch.
of Law John M. Olin Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2009-09), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1446897.
26. 597 P.2d at 702, 709.
27. Id. at 704– 05.
28. Id. at 711.
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simple sterilization because of a bad experience with a form of
abortion, regarded her upset as “physical and emotional,” not based
on the statute’s required “religious beliefs or moral convictions.”29
Courts should not be in the business of assessing the rationality of
beliefs and of how triggering events generate those beliefs.30 It is enough
that a person now believes that participation is morally wrong or
contrary to her religious beliefs.31 This conclusion does mean that the
line between such convictions and mere emotional or aesthetic aversion is thin, but the test is the actual convictions of a claimant.
Some cases involve the edges of actual and desirable protection.
In Spellacy v. Tri-County Hospital,32 a part-time admissions clerk
whose job involved various personal contacts with admitted patients
told her supervisor that her religious beliefs precluded her from
admitting patients for abortions.33 After the hospital relieved her of any
personal contact with abortion patients, she for a time continued to
type up their lab and admission forms.34 But she then decided she did
not want to do any admission procedures for them.35 She refused
alternative jobs the hospital offered her.36 So long as there is no significant personal contact with the patients, I do not think everyone
remotely connected to patients, including those who type their forms,
make their beds, dish out their meals, and clean their rooms, should
have a right of conscience to refuse based on the procedure the
patient undergoes. The tie to the objectionable practice is too remote.
(Although Title VII may cover such instances if religious observance
is involved, the employer can meet its obligations by making modest
efforts to accommodate, as the hospital did here.) When significant
personal contact is required, a genuine objector may believe (or feel)
she cannot be civil to someone setting out to commit a terrible sin.
Perhaps protection should kick in at that stage.
Another issue about “edges” involved a claim by a university
student not to be assessed fees that went in part for abortions. In

29. Id. at 711–15.
30. This conclusion fits that of the Supreme Court’s approach to a free exercise claim for
unemployment compensation in Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 714–15 (1981).
31. This sentence both reflects my judgment and is implied by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Thomas. Id. at 715–16.
32. Equity No. 77-1788, 1978 WL 3437 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 23, 1978).
33. Id. at *1.
34. Id. at *2.
35. Id.
36. Id. at *2–*3.
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Erzinger v. Regents of the University of California,37 a California Court

of Appeals rejected the claim. The United States Supreme Court has
consistently refused to sustain claims that paying particular taxes that
contravene religious convictions is a violation of free exercise rights.38
I think this is a realm in which a kind of imaginative accommodation
may be desirable. Let those opposed in conscience to paying certain
taxes pay the amount owed plus an extra amount to some other
valuable endeavor. Suppose student fees are $500 per year, and 1% of
those fees go to abortions. An objecting student might be allowed to
pay $495 in fees and $50 to an independent university fund, or pay no
fees but $750 to the independent fund. But such ingenious strategies
should be up to the universities or those who supervise them, not part
of a right of conscience specifically related to health care.
One powerful argument against limitations on who can claim
rights of conscience is that those remotely connected to procedures to
which they object will perceive plenty of disadvantages in asserting
their claims, whatever the law itself says, and thus the kind of cutoff
I have suggested will only serve to harm those few who have
genuinely serious claims. The factual premise of this argument is
probably true in general, although it may not apply to the university
student who seeks to make a public statement and whose vocational
status is not at risk.
Nevertheless, I believe there is some value in the law denying that
every remote connection really amounts to significant participation.
Further, the acceptability of rights of conscience for members of the
public may be partially undercut if they sense that weird, implausible
claims are being vindicated.
The most difficult questions concern what patients and consumers
should be expected to sacrifice.39 In Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman
Marina Hospital,40 the police had brought a rape victim to a Catholic
hospital’s emergency room. She acknowledged that she was told both
that she should see her doctor within two days and that the hospital
did not provide morning after pill treatment.41 She said she was not
told that the effective use of that treatment was limited to seventy-two
37. 185 Cal. Rptr. 791 (Ct. App. 1982), vacated, 187 Cal. Rptr. 164 (Ct. App. 1982).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
39. See Wilson, supra note 19, at 52–55 (providing a nuanced and detailed treatment of
competing considerations, in respect to recent controversies over extending conscience
protections).
40. 256 Cal. Rptr. 240, 242 (Ct. App. 1989).
41. Id.
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hours after intercourse.42 I assume that a high percentage of raped
women would wish to take some form of emergency contraceptive,
and that many of those will have no idea about the temporal limit on
effective use. Certainly for a rape victim who does not choose a
particular hospital, I think more needs to be done in terms of
informing (whether members of the hospital itself do so or offer to
put her in direct touch with someone else willing to give full advice)
than was done in this instance. Neither an institutional nor an individual right of conscience should prevail over a patient’s interest of
this strength.
I am inclined to think the same outcome is appropriate for one
who voluntarily chooses a Catholic hospital, unless there are other
available facilities, the patient is in a physical condition to shift
hospitals, and the hospital makes clear before admission that it
eschews a form of treatment the patient might well desire. For this
purpose, a printed and signed form should not be enough—many of
us do not read these carefully in calm situations, and more cannot be
expected of someone who has just been raped. A clear, specific oral
communication should be required.
Somewhat separate from how a right of conscience should bear on
provision and information about emergency contraceptives is the
issue of whether they should count as a form of abortion if the law
gives a right of conscience restricted to abortion. The answer is no.
Without question, some religious groups and individuals do believe
these often constitute a form of abortion.43 But whether one focuses
on original understanding, in either its textualist or intentionalist
variation, or on present understanding, most legislators and citizens
do not think of the morning after pill as abortion.44 The terms
defining the subjects to which a right of conscience extends should be
understood as are other statutory terms, not according to the individual
refuser’s particular conception or that of his religious group.
Another issue that poses a difficult adjustment of competing
claims is the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment at the request of
a patient or his family in circumstances when most doctors would
regard such a withdrawal as appropriate, if the institution at which
the patient is staying has a religious objection to such treatment, or
42. Id. at 242– 44.
43. U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, MARRIED LOVE AND THE GIFT OF LIFE 8–9 (2006),
http://www.usccb.org/laity/marriage/MarriedLove.pdf.
44. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, EMERGENCY
CONTRACEPTION 3 (2009), http://www.womenshealth.gov/faq/emergency-contraception.pdf.
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some doctors or nurses have a moral objection to it.45 An individual
doctor’s or nurse’s objection should be accommodated if that will not
significantly affect options available for the patient. The harder issue
here is posed by institutional objections. If other facilities are available
and the institution has made its policy clear at the time of admission—
again in something much stronger than a written form—it should be
able to adhere to that policy. Any contention that it is up to the patient
or his family to inquire at the time of admission is weak; we cannot
expect those involved in an emotionally charged admission to a
hospital or nursing home to be thinking about what should be done
if the extreme contingency that might lead to withdrawal arises.
Suppose an adequate warning has not been given and the patient
cannot be moved elsewhere. The facility and its personnel should not
be required to participate, but they should be required to allow outside
doctors to enter the facility to carry out the wishes of the patient or his
family. My present sense is that this should be required even if
transferring the patient to another facility is practical. For me, this is a
very close question, but I believe that for a patient and/or his family
members, such a transfer would exact a considerable emotional cost.
And the institution has the ability to require the transfer if it makes its
policy clear in advance.
When the right claimed against an institution is by a doctor to
perform an operation to which the institution objects, such as
sterilization, the right balance is that the institution can forbid doctors
regularly using its facilities from routinely performing such operations,
but cannot base its decisions about a doctor on the doctor’s expressed
views or on what the doctor does outside the facility.
In respect to merger of facilities, much depends on availability. If
a merged institution will be the dominant facility in a community, the
facility to which most people will go, it is regrettable if forms of health
care once available become unavailable because of the religious
convictions of one of the partners.
There are roughly three possible approaches to the way a right of
conscience may be formulated: 1) courts are left to apply a general
standard; 2) specific legislative resolutions for particular subjects; and
3) delegation to an administrative or quasi-governmental body to work
out appropriate resolutions. Let us put aside for the moment political
considerations about what strategy promises legislative action.

45.

See White, supra note 22, at 1721–24.
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I was initially drawn to a general standard of the sort proposed by
Lynn Wardle.46 We have an exemplar of such a standard in the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”),47 adopted after the
Supreme Court decided Employment Division v. Smith. 48 According
to RFRA, “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion” unless it does so in furtherance of a “compelling . . . interest” and uses “the least restrictive means.”49 The
Supreme Court held the act invalid as applied to the states,50 but a
number of states have adopted their own similar provisions, and others
use a similar test in applying their own state free exercise clauses.51
Four points are worth noting. Such a statute does in principle
protect some religious rights of conscience for health-care workers,
those employed by the federal government or relevant states, and
those otherwise required by law to perform particular services. The
required “compelling interest” has never been as powerful as is
needed to justify restrictions on freedom of expression.52 Exactly
what will count as a sufficient interests depends considerably on the
level at which an interest is framed. The government has a compelling
interest in providing health care, but it may not have a compelling
interest in avoiding some inconvenience for the consumers of health
care.53 Although “substantial burden” and “compelling interest-least
restrictive means” are cast as independent measures, courts inevitably
do a kind of balance, considering the government’s interest in
conjunction with the degree of burden.54
States can, like Washington,55 use such an approach specifically
for health care, extending protection to cover those who work for
private employers. The problem, as I now view it, is that the relevant
considerations are so complex that those who are called to accommodate will have difficulty knowing when they need to do so, and
courts will be hard put to reach persuasive, consistent results. Were

46. See Wardle, supra note 6, at 19 –26.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
48. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (2000).
50. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 – 36 (1997).
51. See 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS
201– 02 (2006).
52. Id. at 214 –15.
53. See id. at 215 –16.
54. Id. at 217 .
55. See Wardle, supra note 6, at 45–46.
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one to favor more absolute rights of conscience than I have suggested,
both these problems would be reduced.56
Were legislators to put in the effort, there is much to be said for
specific legislative resolutions for various forms of health care. Legislators might set up an expert panel to recommend areas to which a
right of conscience would extend and to suggest formulations of the
rights and their limits. When such rights are in place, it might be
desirable to have a small expert administrative board as an intermediary between individual disputants and courts, a board that
would provide the initial review when employers and claimants
cannot agree about the applicability of a claimed right of conscience.
Political recommendations about how to proceed must depend
partly on political feasibility. It is unrealistic to think legislators will
spend much time worrying about a few fringe or bizarre claims that
have little general appeal. A general standard might better achieve
desirable coverage by implicitly embracing such claims along with
those that have wider support. But given the desire of many people
to get health care as conveniently as possible, perhaps a broad
standard will frighten legislators, who might respond more favorably
to claims limited to particular areas, as they have in respect to
abortion. Since attitudes and social conditions vary widely within the
United States, I doubt whether any one strategy is politically most
promising for all states in which advocates seek a broadening of
rights of conscience.

56. Id. at 2 (“[H]ealth-care providers’ rights of conscience have been and can be fully
protected while patient access to services is accommodated but only if there is full commitment
to protecting, not sacrificing or giving nominal respect for, rights of conscience.”).

